1. The
Scientific Method for Researching Truth
According
to Muslim Scholars and Others
Introduction
If
realising the truth as it actually is is science, as they say, then the method
that is used to achieve this realisation should–without a doubt–also be
scientific, i.e. the method that is used should be none other than a series of
true realisations in and of themselves that remove the veil from the reality
that is being sought.
This is
because science is not the product of anything but another science like it.
Conjecture can never arrive at knowledge, and if this were not the case then
two conjectural premises could bring about a definitive result, and this is
clearly impossible.
Therefore,
everyone who searches for the truth must use a scientific method that is not
corrupted by whims and fancies. He must cling to this method and not deviate
from it in any way.
This is a
clear axiom that nobody can dispute.
However, it
is very likely that we can ask: to what extent do Islamic thought and Western
thought apply this axiom and pay attention to it?
Maybe the
word “objective research” is a quick answer, a well-known and widespread phrase
that is commonly associated, amongst some people, with the research of
orientalists, so does it answer this question?
It seems
that relying on this “objective research” alone to arrive at a judgement is a
way to truth that is tumultuous and not scientific. There is no doubt that it
causes us to deviate from the truth while at the same time deluding us into
thinking that we have actually found it.
It would be
good for us to look for the answer to this question by looking at the actual
path that is taken by both Muslim and Western scholars to arrive at some truth,
whether it is evaluative (as they say) or historical.
We
must–before anything else–establish a truth that has importance in this regard,
and it is that the primary factor in subjugating Islamic thought to an exact
and scientific method of research, as we will see, is nothing other than the
Religion. If it were not for their religious belief, Muslims would not burden
themselves with the difficulty of such a method that requires time and effort
and does not bring about any specific material gain, and then ardently cling to
it until it becomes something normal for all of them, as they encounter it and
study it together.
This
religious objective is exemplified in many passages in the Book of Allah the
Exalted, one of them being His saying, Glorified and Majestic: “And do
not concern yourself with anything that you have no knowledge of. Indeed the
ears, the eyes and the hearts will all be brought to account.” [Al-Isrāʾ
17:36]. This saying of His, Glorified and Majestic, is a rebuke of people who
have plunged their intellects into the obscurities of whims and conjectures
which, by their very nature, cover the truth and do not reveal it.
“For
most of them follow nothing but conjecture: conjecture can never be a
substitute for truth. Verily, Allah has full knowledge of all that they do.” [Yūnus
10:36]
You can see
how embodied in this motive is the prohibition against adopting any idea, even
the Religion itself, from being the outcome of anything other than a path
established by an intellect that readily accepts definitive proofs that by
their nature reveal the truth that is sought.
It is
because of this that the scholars of tawhid have stipulated as
a condition for a believer’s faith that it be based solely on knowledge-based
proof and not suspicious facts resulting from merely following someone else.
This is
because scientific truth–in the ruling of the Religion[1]–is the
summit of all intellectually sacred things, such as are its sources. It is what
thought must turn to in humility and revolve around. Is there a stronger
evidence in this regard than the fact that the Religion itself is not satisfied
with its existence and its sanctity being based on anything other than
knowledge and its proofs, and it is not pleased to take a judge for itself from
anywhere else?
All of this
means that Islam grants a religious quality to searching for the truth with
only the two lights of knowledge and the intellect. If a non-Muslim, by his
nature, engages in this because of his love for research, then indeed the
Muslim is motivated to do research because he feels that it is an obligation
that he is rewarded for doing and punished for not doing.
And this is
how Islamic thought found itself in front of a religious duty, and it is the
necessity of searching for the truth, whether it is by way of transmission or
by way of claims. It is self-evident that fulfilling this duty will require the
laying down of a method of research. It is obvious that as long as the
objective is sound and intact and only the intellect can judge regarding it,
the method of attaining the objective will also be sound and intact, being
governed only by the intellect.
But despite
that, we are not writing this study so that we can rush and make a judgement
that the scientific method that the Muslims have is sound and intact and is
only governed by the intellect. Our only intention is to study this method and
we will make a decision regarding it afterwards.
The Method
of Research According to Muslim Scholars:
The
scientific method of research according to Muslim scholars can be summarized in
the great and glorious maxim that no one else has anything that compares to it,
and it is their statement:
If you are
transmitting then [you need to] authenticate it, and if you are claiming
[something then you need] evidence.
This means
that the topic of research must either be a piece of information that has been
transmitted or a claim that has been made. As for what may be a transmitted
piece of information, research into it must be restricted to verifying the
relationship between it and its source. Otherwise the door is open for
speculation, confusion and doubt. If speculation is eliminated and the veil is
lifted then the result of the transmitted information is a specific scientific
truth, on the condition that it possesses decisive evidence.
As for what
is merely a claim, research into it must be directed towards scientific
evidences that agree with it and which by their nature will reveal the extent
to which this claim is true.
For every
type of claim there is a type of scientific evidence that suits it and cannot
be substituted for anything else. Claims that are related to the nature of
material things and their essence can only be connected to scientific proofs
that are tangible and experiential. Claims that are connected to things like
logic and numbers can only be accepted alongside established and sound proofs.
Claims that are connected to civil rights and affairs can only be of benefit if
they are accompanied by clear proofs upon which there is agreement that they
are necessarily applicable. In this way a claim does not become an established
scientific truth unless it is presented with the appropriate evidence. Evidence
that may back up the claim does not have any scientific value unless there is
conformity between them in terms of nature and type.
Bearing
that in mind, what, then, is the scientific method that the scholars of Islam
have laid down in order to verify the relationship between the piece of
information and its source and to verify the scientific value of a claim
according to what we have just mentioned?
The path
that is taken to verify a piece of information:
In this
path a number of specific techniques have emerged that cannot be found in
history outside of the Islamic library, and they are: ḥadīth terminology
(muṣṭalaḥ al-ḥadīth), authentification and classification (al-jarḥ
wa al-taʿdīl) and the biographies of men (tarājum al-rijāl), and
these three techniques intersect in order to lay down an exact standard for distinguishing
a true piece of information from what is otherwise, and the difference between
a rigorously authentic piece of information that brings about conjecture and
one which brings about certainty.
A piece of
information reaches the level of rigorously authentic (ṣiḥah) when it is
firmly established, by way of exact analysis and research, that the chain of
transmission is joined from the one who carries the piece of information all
the way back to its source, and this transmission is accurate and just
throughout such that there is no anomaly in its content and no defect in its
narration. If the piece of information does not reach this level, because a
ring in the chain of transmission is missing because we do not know who he is,
or there is lack of confidence in his uprightness, or a lack of certainty
regarding his memorisation and his precision, or the actual text that is being
transmitted does not agree with what has been generally accepted, it is not
rigorously authentic.
But the
rigorously authentic, in and of itself, has ascending levels, starting from
strong probability to certain realization. If the chain of transmission that
carries all the essentials of rigorous authenticity is comprised of single
narrators who transmitted the information between themselves, then it is
inevitable that it will be conjectural information according to the intellect.
If the rings in the chain of transmission are comprised of two or three
narrators then it is still conjectural information but it is stronger than the
first example while remaining less than certain.
If each
chain becomes chains, i.e. groups of narrators, then the intellect is satisfied
that no lie has been made, and at that point the narrated information acquires
the attribute of certainty, and it is what is called mass-transmitted (mutawātir)
information.
As for
rigorously authentic information that is conjectural, the Islamic ruling does
not consider it in matters of creed, because conjecture is of no benefit in
this matter. The Qurʾān has prohibited (in the field of studying creed) the
following of conjecture. This is as you have seen. However, it is considered in
the scope of practical laws, to affirm mass-transmitted information and
decisive evidence based on the fact that the Muslim–with regards to scientific
conduct–is legally obligated to depend on the rigorously authentic that is
conjectural. This is because it is valid for legal rulings to be based on
rigorously authentic aḥādīth even if they are from a single
chain of transmission (āḥād), and this is caution and prudence in the
matter.
As for the
rigorously authentic that is certain, what is called mass-transmitted
information, it alone is what is considered when establishing the creed and
indisputable established concepts. This means that man is not obliged to
believe in something transmitted unless it is based on mass-transmitted proof.
If the evidence is from a single chain of transmission then certainty in it
depends on one’s personal conviction.
You may ask
me: How does the researcher know the conditions for a piece of information to
be rigorously authentic? We have made it obligatory that he hears the chain of
transmission, but how can he know about the contact that these narrators had
with one another when they are all reliable, trustworthy and precise?
The answer:
indeed both sciences of authentification and classification and the biographies
of men have facilitated the path of this study and made easy the examination of
the position that should be adopted.
In our
Islamic library, there are several works that present details about the men
whose names are found in any of the chains of transmission that we
have. You can stop and look at the biography of whomever you wish in
order to classify and authenticate him and determine the age in which he lived,
and thereby you will know his contemporaries whom he may have come into contact
with. What is strange is that those imams who concentrated on the
gathering of the biographies of men–and they are trustworthy imams, and each
one of them is considered to be an authority in this regard–were not worried,
whilst looking for the truth and respecting the scientific standard, that any
corruption would tarnish it, such that they put the diacritical points on their
letters to provide a very exact description of each person regardless of
whether they would conclude that such a person was unreliable and to be avoided
or he was to be trusted and relied upon.
And so
forth, for in our Islamic library there are dictionaries of a different kind
that have been compiled... dictionaries that accurately describe individuals
and men; from then you can learn about what is false and not connected to the
subject with the same ease that allows you to learn the accurate definition of
a word and its explanation in the known dictionaries and lexicons of language.
As we have
in our library a specific discipline that has been compiled in this regard, and
it is what is called the discipline of ḥadīth terminology, and this technique
includes all the various essentials for substantiating transmissions and pieces
of information in accordance with a unique scientific method.
This is a brief
summary of the scientific path that the scholars of Islam possess for
substantiating transmissions and pieces of information, and there is no desire
in these brief words to go into further detail and explanation, but whoever
wishes to go further must apply himself to the techniques that we have pointed
to in order to find the amazing, inimitable effort that was expended for the
sake of extracting the scientific value from the transmitted “word”.
The path
taken in order to substantiate claims:
This path
differs, as we have said, according to how claims differ, and thus what is
connected to some material existence is dealt with by way of analysis and
modification. It is inevitable that one rely on evidences and proofs from the
five senses, i.e. on what is called in modern parlance “experience and
observation”. Therefore, it is the natural means of arriving at certainty in
these kinds of matters.
Islam does
not hesitate to adopt anything that has been definitely established by this
means.
As for the
opposite side, indeed science cannot present to us, even today, any scientific
reality that contravenes any particular of Islamic theology.
Furthermore,
nothing in the Book or the Sunnah has made us legally responsible for any
clear, specific information connected to the material things in existence
around us. Rather, the Book and the Sunnah have given us expressions that
indicate them and prompt us to think about them and reflect on them, more so
than giving us information about them, and this is by relying on the means and
apparatuses that Allah has provided man with and which are the natural tool for
removing the veil of ignorance from every material reality in existence.
This is the
secret behind the Qurʾān's not going into great detail with regards to the
scientific laws that are connected to what is tangible and observable. If the
Qurʾān had done that, it would have thus become obligatory upon people to
believe in these details, and that in turn would have burdened human minds with
having to adopt scientific realities without arriving at them by way of the
proofs that are harmonious with them, i.e. experience and observation. The
Qurʾān has not burdened anyone with this task, and this is in order to honour
the intellect and give it the freedom to use its natural method of unveiling
tangible realities.
This is
why, in these matters, you find the Qurʾān doing no more than pushing those
endowed with intellect towards exploring and investigating by using their
scientific, unveiling means. As for what it contains by way of information
about the unseen, it has undoubtedly gone into great detail, because there is
absolutely no way for experience and observation to arrive at that information.
The only way to arrive at certainty in these matters is through Allah’s Book,
Mighty and Majestic is He, or the mass-transmitted Sunnah.
This is the
case for claims that are connected to tangible matters.
As for
claims that are connected to the unseen and are not subject to any of the
outward senses, there is what you find in the Book or the mass-transmitted
Sunnah by way of a clear text and there is that for which you do not find in
either of them any clear account.
As for what
is found in clear texts, this comes within the scope of indisputably
established concepts.
The path of
certainty is either by way of the transmission of the Book or the transmission
of the Sunnah, going back to the certainty of a mass-transmitted piece of
information, which we have already discussed. Thus, the Qurʾān is the words
that were revealed to Muhammad, may Allah’s blessings and peace be upon him,
and they have come to us by way of mass transmission. Thus, there is absolutely
no doubt that its words are Qurʾānic, and like the Qurʾān the same applies to
the Sunnah if it has reached us by way of mass-transmission.
As for the
veracity of what the Qurʾān itself contains, irrespective of whether it is
Qurʾān and has reached us from the Prophet, may Allah’s blessings and peace be
upon him, with certainty, that is another scientific matter that falls under
the second category of claims connected to abstract issues or unseen matters.
Know that the underlying cause of that goes back to verifying the phenomenon of
revelation in the lifetime of the Prophet, may Allah’s blessings and peace be
upon him, and verifying the matter therein, which is based on proofs of
certainty that rely on complete induction and necessary connection, as we will
show later in our study.
In other
words, the decisive and established texts in the Book give us certainty
regarding their contents, and this is after passing two stages of
investigation: the first stage is verifying the chain of transmission of the
Qurʾān from our master Muhammad, may Allah’s blessings and peace be upon him,
to us. The second stage is verifying his, may Allah’s blessings and peace be
upon him, informing that the Qurʾān is from Allah.
If the
second stage is verified in light of the principles that we shall mention
shortly, then the texts of the Book become a source of permanent certainty. This
is the meaning of what we said before: 'As for what is found in clear texts,
this comes within the scope of indisputably established concepts'.
After that
there is no difference between the intellect having a means of digesting and
understanding these unseen matters in its own way and not having those means,
just like those unseen matters that we only know about because we have been
veraciously informed of them, such as the establishment of the Hour, the
gathering of the bodies, and the existence of Paradise, the Fire and the
Angels. It is sufficient for these things to be grasped with certainty by the
fact that they have been informed of and dealt with by a clear text from the
Book of Allah or a mass-transmitted ḥadīth from the Sunnah.
Despite the
nature of the Qurʾān in this regard, it still presses us to reflect and
investigate everything that it informs us of and to have certainty in it,
namely those unseen matters that the human intellect can ponder and sense the
reality thereof, such as the existence of Allah, Mighty and Majestic, the
occurrence of what is possible,[3] certain
things' being made the means for other things,[4] and
similar matters.
The
scholars of scholastic theology (ʿilm al-kalām) have gone deep into
researching these matters by way of merely the intellect and speculation,
without placing veracious information as an intermediary between them on the
one hand and the intellect and speculation on the other. The reason they have
not done so is not that it is the only means but rather for the sake of opening
another path of research towards certainty alongside the path of veracious
information.
Thus,
Islamic thought arrives at faith in Allah’s existence and His oneness, along
with what follows from it, by travelling along two paths, both of which are an
exact and scientific method without any defect:
The first
path begins with the stage of researching the phenomenon of revelation, and
once that has been passed, one moves on to the stage of researching the
veracity of what has been transmitted, ensuring that the essentials of
certainty are abundantly present therein. Once that has been passed, one can be
certain of the matter and its veracity because of the veracity of its
preliminary matters.
As for the
second path, it is shorter. One researches the matter based on guidance from
nothing but thinking and rational proofs, without moving too far away from
prophecy and its reality or the Qurʾān and its veracity.
In the end,
both paths lead the researcher to the truth. Indeed, they eventually meet and
strengthen one another.
As
for what is not mentioned by a certain, mass-transmitted piece of information,
without any clear or obvious text, then the means of knowing the
truth therein are restricted to rational investigation alone, which is realised
by way of two paths:
The First
Path: To follow what is called dalālat al-iltizām
This means
finding a direct connection between two things, such that when you think about
one of them you imagine the other.
This can
only be done after complete induction, which is to study all the various states
and circumstances in which these two things exist, and thus one finds that they
are always connected to each other.
For
example, if someone’s body has considerably weakened it is assumed[6] that
he is ill. If a town has a minaret it is assumed that its people are Muslims.
The sound of the siren that is specific to fire trucks makes one assume that
there is a fire. If a man is seen in the street in a drunken state it is
assumed that he drank some intoxicant.
The
indicator in all of these examples is not the cause of what is being indicated,
such that we can say that the fact of something's indicating something else is
one thing causing the other. Therefore, having a weak body is not the cause of
the illness. A minaret is not the cause of people's being Muslim in a town.
Hearing a siren is not the cause of a fire, and a man's being in a drunken
state is not a cause of his having drunk an intoxicant.
While you
may witness the indicator in each of these examples, you do not see or witness
what is being indicated, such that you can say that the proof is seeing and
observation. Rather, it is something hidden from your observation and your
perception.
Therefore,
how do these things indicate what they indicate, and how can we believe in them
without seeing them?
The way of
the indicator is known because the indicator is always connected to what it
indicates, and this is repeated continuously and is proven by induction. Thus,
out of this permanent association, an effective link of indication is formed
between them.
The way to
make use of this proof is to reflect on some phenomenon that you witness in
front of you. If you see–by way of induction–that this phenomenon necessitates
a specific reality then it is natural, according to the intellect, to believe
in it, even though it is not visible in front of you. A person who sees an
ambulance racing with an unceasing siren will not doubt that there is a sick
person who is suffering in a life-threatening situation, even though he cannot
see him. In fact, it is very likely that he is thinking more about the state of
the patient than about the vehicle that is passing in front of him.
When one of
them presents a claim to you, very often you are able, with the means of
circumstantial evidence, to determine whether it is true or false. That is done
by way of looking for the necessary consequences of this claim. If you see
these necessary consequences in front of you then that is proof of the veracity
of the claim. If they are not there or the consequences are the opposite, that
is proof of the falsehood of the claim.
Thus, if a
man who lives in the suburbs of a town tells you that all its inhabitants are
Muslims, it is not possible for you to believe what he is saying if you
contemplate and find nothing above its buildings but crosses on churches,
despite the fact that you have not met any of its people and you have not
discovered what their theology or religion is by way of experience and
observation. If someone claims to you that the source of thought and intellect
in man is his feeling the need for food, you cannot believe his claim if you
reflect on all other animals that share with man the feeling of needing food
but do not, as a result, possess thought and intellect.
The Types
of Implication of Connection:
Implication
of connection does not always lead to certainty, as the matter is dependent on
how clear the connection is between the two things and to what extent further
proof is needed. This is why the scholars have divided implication of
connection into three types, ascending in strength from the lowest to the
highest:
The first
is called al-luzūm ghayr al-bayyin, which
is to state definitively that there is a connection in the matter based on an
additional proof, such as the evidence for the corners of a triangle having at
least two angles. The intellect does not automatically come to this conclusion
for every triangle unless it has come across another proof that affirms it,
such as imagining a circle and knowing its degrees. Thus, this evidence alone
is not considered a proof because it, in and of itself, needs other proofs and
evidence to indicate it. However, it is considered partial proof that is
completed by being supplemented with other proofs.
The second
is called al-luzūm al-bayyin bil-maʿnā al-ʿamm, which
is to realise the connection between two things by imagining both of them and
investigating the matter for a long time, such as the evidence for something's
being merely possible based on the fact that it is ḥādith, or
Allah's existing by necessity based on the fact that He is qadīm.[ You
would not understand the connection between things that are possible and the
attribute of temporary existence unless you had carefully studied the meaning
of possibility and
realised that it is anything that is not impossible for the intellect to
imagine not existing, and it has been preferred to exist and preferred to be
contingent. Then you will have carefully studied the meaning of temporary
existence and imagined the connection between it and everything that is possible,
which, by definition, exists because of something else affecting it.
However, in
any case, you still need to imagine another proof (as is the case with an
unclear connection) in order to establish this connection.
The third
is al-luzūm al-bayyin bil-maʿnā al-khāṣ, which
means that imagining the connection alone is sufficient for imagining the
connection and making an apodictic judgment, such as the ambulance's indicating
the patient in the previous example, or, in natural cases, an illness's being
indicated by groaning in pain, or, in rational cases, a living being's
presence's being indicated by an utterance coming from someone in the dark. The
strength of the connection between each of these matters makes the intellect
imagine the illness by merely imagining the groaning, and imagine the living
being by merely hearing the utterance coming from the dark without needing to
reflect on the connection between the two.
This third
type is the strongest of them in terms of indicating and in terms of the
strength of the proof, followed by the second type. As for the first
type, it is an unclear connection and cannot be considered an independent
proof. Rather, it can only be considered proof when there is an additional
proof that reveals the veracity of the connection, as we have mentioned.
The Second
Path: Analogy (qiyās)
What is
meant here is not the logical analogy that is adopted from Greek philosophy,
which is based on propositions and perceptual forms, but rather the meaning of analogy
according to the scholars of uṣūl al-fiqh. and
the scholars of uṣūl al-dīn (al-mutakallimīn) after
they took inspiration from the Book of Allah, Mighty and Majestic.
This is a
method that can be summarised as extracting a cause (ʿillah) for
something or its reason (sabab) and then looking for what might resemble
it from amongst unknown matters until the researcher is certain that both the
known and the unknown share one cause, and thus an analogy is made from the
former and its ruling that is taken from the effect of that cause is applied to
the latter.
The concept
of analogy is based on two principles, both of which are intellectually
accepted truths that require no proof.
The first
principle is the law of causation, i.e. everything caused has a cause and every
effect has something that influenced it.
The second
principle is the law of harmony and order in the world, i.e. the minor, partial
manifestations of the universe, even though they are of different shapes, are
connected by comprehensive reasons which by their nature establish harmony and
symmetry between all of them, and no matter how closely you examine the natures
of these reasons you will see, eventually, that they are combined in the
smallest number of causes and reasons.
Analogy is
only based on these two principles, as well, by means of induction (istiqrāʾ)
as it is what informs the researcher of the reality of the reason. Then it is
what, by means of itself, realises the established, comprehensive relationships
between things that are outwardly dispersed or different, and this is how we
notice that complete induction is an indispensable condition for the two proofs:
connection and analogy.
The method
of investigation here is that you follow the particulars of what you claim is
the reason behind a specific matter, and that you find that it is not separate
from the production of what it causes.
This is
done by contemplating the relationship between the cause and the thing caused,
for you will see therein the phenomenon of conformity and reflection, i.e.
every time the cause is found the thing caused is found, and every time the
cause is absent the thing caused is absent. Then you look further into the
cause and you find that it influences the caused thing with indisputable proof,
for this conformity or reflection between the two could merely be due to
coincidence or some other factor.
This is how
you know that the condition of analogy here (i.e. in building one’s theology
and indisputable matters) is that the cause influence the thing caused, that it
conform and reflect, and that it clearly not change with time or place.
If the
cause does not meet the level of this condition, such as the influence's
therein not being obvious and there only being some apparent agreement with the
thing caused, this is a presumptive analogy (qiyās ẓannī), which is
not accepted in theological or intellectual judgments. It may only be accepted
in practical, legal issues. To establish decisive evidence based on presumptive
evidences, which suffice for worship and rulings of the Revealed Law, as we
mentioned above, it suffices in the analogy of practical rulings of the
Revealed Law that the cause not change with time or place and that it conform
and reflect, but it is not stipulated that it influence. Rather, it is
sufficient for there to be agreement in the personal reasoning (ijtihād)
of the researcher in order to build the ruling on top of it. Thus, analogy in
practical legalities of the Revealed Law actually differs greatly from the
nature of analogy and its conditions in theological matters.
An example
of this would be to see houses or tents from afar in which people live, for
that would make you certain of the existence of water in that place.
The path to
certainty therein is that you would call to mind, by quickly glancing at every
other place you know in which people live, and see that one of the most
important reasons behind a place's being suitable for people to inhabit it is
the availability of water. This notion does not change under any circumstances,
as you notice the influence of the cause (sabab), which is the water,
upon the thing caused, which is subsistence and the feasibility of life.
At that
point, you can draw an analogous conclusion from those other places and apply
it to this place that appears before you at a distance and decisively affirm
the existence of water therein even though you have not seen it with your own
eyes.
If this
same example were reversed, such that you saw a small amount of water from a
distance and then understood from that observation that people were living
there, it would be merely conjecture with no possibility of being elevated to
the level of certainty.
This is
because the causality of water for human life is an established fact based on
the evidence of influence, for water must be present wherever people are
present. As for the causality of water for the existence of people around it, this
is merely something appropriate and in conformity.
Another
example of this is everything that possesses the appearance of being made and
planned being proof of someone making it and planning it. It is a necessity
that the thing caused not be separated from its cause.
From here
you know that Muslim scholars only pursue the inductive method when they come
across anything that cannot be subject to experience and observation, and in
the shadow of this method they gather together both circumstantial connection
and analogy. As you can see, it is as remote as possibly can be from the
metaphysical conclusions and abstract contemplations that Greek philosophy
delved into ever so deeply.
Indeed,
anyone who reflects on the Islamic method of research knows that the scholars
of Islam cannot establish any rational or creedal ruling unless it is upon the
foundations of reality, in which all the elements of certainty are gathered.
As for
those other realities that remain hidden behind the veil of doubts and have not
been grasped except by the hand of theoretical inference, such as those that
have emerged in the course of historical studies or discovered relics or
ancient fossils, Islamic history does not know of any fact of certainty
that was established upon them or that they were ever adopted as proof of
criticism, demonstration (istidlāl) or the building of an idea. Rather,
they have remained disjointed research and doubt around which every possibility
revolves, as well as a path that calls for the connecting of the various
strands of information using correct, inductive research.
***
This has
been a very quick summary of the scientific method of research according to the
Muslims. We have taken it from what is found in their researches, not from
abstract theories that are contained in their libraries. After that, we want to
ask about the method of research according to others, according to the scholars
of the West, such as the thinkers and the orientalists, those who have
broadcast and spread the word “objectivity” around their researches. Indeed,
this is the foundation that pushed us to write this introduction.
There is no
doubt that it has been made clear to the reader, by looking at the first
section of this discussion, that I am not seeking to study both methods of
research, the Islamic and the Western, in an analytical fashion that would make
it subject to an exposition of different schools of thought that may exist
therein, or historical phases or a critique of the theories themselves. Rather,
what I intend is to clarify two facts.
The
first is
to explain the extent to which Islamic thought relies on the pure
objective methods in its researches and then explain the extent to which
Western thought enjoys its share–more or less–of the same.
The
second is
to explain the extent to which there could be cohesion and
concomitance between the methods of research (in that they are specific,
intellectual studies and conventions) and between the various scientific
methods, according to both Muslims and others, i.e. the degree to which
these methods embody truth and correct scientific application.
We–for the
sake of elucidating this fact–do not want to derive the scientific method of
research according to Muslim scholars from anything apart from what is found in
their own researches, not so that in the end we can merely know that there is
an independent discipline in the Islamic library connected to the method of
research, but rather that–and this is what is most important in this
discussion–we can know the extent to which this method is applied to the
Islamic sciences themselves.
The Method
of Research According to Westerners:
We will
conclude this discussion of ours by following the same path that we started on,
and thus we ask:
What is the
scientific method that Western thought follows in all the various sciences that
it comes across?
There is no
escape from going back and dividing the subject of science, whatever its type,
into two sides: a report that needs to be verified and a claim whose veracity needs
to be ascertained.
We will
start with the first of them and say:
The method
of testing transmissions and reports:
We do not
need to exert much thought in reflecting on the answer, for the reality is that
the Western method is devoid, until now, of any objective standard for
verifying anything connected to narrations and transmissions.
There is
what they call the retrieval method (al-manhaj al-istirdādī) or the
intuitive method (manhaj at-tawassum), the first pillar of which is
whatever the researcher may possess by way of depth of perception, precision of
sentiment (wijdān) and broadness of imagination. There are the
tools that the researcher uses, his perception, his sentiment and his
imagination, and everything he may come across by way of relics, events and
documents. The manner of research is for the researcher to focus on the relics
or events that he has gathered in front of him and impose his perception,
sentiment and imagination upon them in order to derive principles, judgments
and factual findings that give him a sense of ease and reassurance.
It is–as
you can see–a method that in the end, regardless of how many tools and
documents are gathered, only has one path, which is the path of speculative
inference, or derivation that is based on nothing more than what is unseen.
This type of derivation, which is stripped of experience and observation, thorough
investigation and true narration, is nothing but a synonym for fancy and doubt
or weak, unstable conjecture. That is with the exception of relying on
historical documents that contain evidence of certainty, in consideration of
what is between them and their source in terms of a relationship of cause and
thing caused, or something's necessitating and something's being necessitated.
Let the
researcher ask: what has prevented Western thought, until today, from adopting
a scientific method with regards to verifying transmissions, despite the
importance of the matter and despite the fact that it constitutes half the
distance towards verifying many various scientific issues.
The answer
is that being concerned with verifying transmissions and reports demands
arduous and strenuous effort without, outwardly, any material return. Such
effort is not exerted unless there is a motive behind it that is stronger than
the intensity of the effort that is to be exerted.
This motive
exists in abundance in Muslim scholars, while not a speck of it exists in
others. Muslim scholars believe in the existence of Allah, Mighty and Majestic,
and in the Prophethood of Muḥammad, may Allah bless him and grant him peace,
and that they are legally responsible for basing their lives upon the way that
has been explained to them in Allah’s Book and in His Messenger’s Sunnah. Thus,
there is no doubt that they are legally responsible for knowing what teaching
and instructions the Messenger, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, has
left behind. They must strive to their utmost to ensure that the factual
certainty that is attached to his life, his biography and his statements is not
mixed with anything that would discredit it, such as fancies, lies and
inventions.
This is how
their certainty made them arrive at this arduous, accurate method that they
have laid down as a standard for the veracity of every narration and date, and
it was an obligation upon them not to underestimate the huge burdens they were
responsible for bearing in applying this method. If it were not for this
certainty and this motive, you would not have seen a single scholar of ḥadīth
travelling hundreds of miles, far from his homeland, in hard, difficult
conditions for nothing other than meeting a shaykh who could narrate a ḥadīth
from the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace. The one
coming to him might have already known it and have memorised it but he wanted
to take it from him as well and ask his permission to narrate it from him so that
he could possess more paths of the ḥadīth and know all the chains of
transmission that it has.
It is very
easy for you to read the chain of transmission of any ḥadīth of the Messenger
of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, in a book such as Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī while
you are reclining on your couch or sitting behind your desk. What is important,
however, is that the illustration of that amazing effort that was generously
expended in order to get just those two lines of a chain of transmission, which
almost no one pays attention to today, is made clear.
This is
about the motive that has pushed Muslim scholars to establish a comprehensive
method for verifying narrations. What could possibly instill this same motive
in others? There is absolutely nothing, as long as the effort that must be
expended in order to acquire it is far greater than the material gain or even
the knowledge that is sought.
At this
juncture, you will notice that many scientific subjects have been treated by
both Islamic and Western thought by way of inquiry using two differing paths in
which discussion and criticism are of no benefit. This is because, for Muslims,
the method of verifying narrations is one of the sources of expounding them,
while for others the corresponding method for doing so is nothing more than
inference.
As an
example of this, let us look at the phenomenon of revelation in the life of the
Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace.
The method
that Muslim scholars have followed in this matter is the following:
First of
all, there is the verification of the narration
and determining the accuracy of the wording and chain of
transmission. All Muslim scholars have reached the conclusion that the ḥadīth
of revelation is authentic (ṣaḥīḥ) and has come through so many various
paths that it has surpassed the threshold of mutawātir maʿnawī.
The second
is complete induction, which has placed them in front of both implication of
connection and analogy of the first (and
the reader should not wait for me to explain this method that the scholars
followed in this regard here, for that will inevitably drag us in another
discussion that we are not concerned with right now).
The
conclusion that Islamic thought arrived at was: the conviction that revelation
is his, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, receiving an essential,
independent reality that is outside of his being and his internal feelings and
far removed from anything he has acquired or from his intellectual or scientific
conduct.
As for the
method that Westerners have followed regarding the same, it is as follows:
The first
step is to take the word “revelation” (waḥī) and consider it a relic or
vague event that history has left behind.
Secondly,
using guesswork and speculation to derive whatever intuition, sentiment and
imagination can comprehend from this word.
After that,
the conclusion that they have arrived at with regard to revelation is that they
have differed and split up into different schools. There are those amongst them
who have concluded that revelation is nothing more than an internal, mental
exercise or type of psychical inspiration. Then there are those who claim that
it is a spiritual illumination that comes by way of a gradual unveiling. And
then there are those who have found nothing wrong in affirming that revelation
is nothing more than epileptic fits that the Messenger of Allah, may Allah
bless him and grant him peace, was afflicted with from time to time.
There is no
expectation that these people and the thinkers of Islam will come to an
agreement regarding this matter, and it is because these people have eliminated
from their consideration the matter of narrations and reports and their
scientific value, whether negative or positive. In other words, they have
deemed it permissible for themselves to ignore authentic, mutawātir narrations
just as they have, at the same time, deemed it permissible to invent an
explanation that is not supported by any report or authentic narration.
Likewise,
they absolutely do not adhere to the method of induction and what is
established by the law of connection and analogy of the first. This has allowed
them to imagine that Muḥammad, peace and blessings be upon him, from the moment
in which he received revelation, had a personality that completely contradicted
the personality he had beforehand, and indeed contradicted the ongoing events
of his life. It has allowed them to make him, peace and blessings be upon him,
the greatest liar in the sight of Allah after he was by far the most
trustworthy and honest of people. They have made him the greatest actor,
deceiver and charlatan, who feigned fear and the yellowing of his face in front
of Khadījah because of something he had seen of revelation while at the same
time he actually did nothing more than apply himself to mere internal thoughts
and inspirations.
***
The method
of testing scientific claims:
Let us now
move to the other side of the subject of science and ask: what is the
scientific method for verifying one claim among all the other claims or one
hypothesis among all the other hypotheses that scholars of the West come
across?
Our
response is as follows. As for those hypotheses that are connected to the
natural sciences, Europe has been able, starting the age of the Renaissance, to
contrive a method for itself, based on experience and observation, that
possesses in abundance all the elements of perplexity and precision, and it is
not just this. Indeed, European thought has been able to use the tales of
discoveries and invention as a means of supporting scientific experience,
backing it up and benefitting immensely from it.
There is no
benefit in your saying, as some like to do, that Europe only inherited this
method from us, the Muslims, during the Middle Ages and its well-known
historical events. The truth is that Europe, to the extent that it is rich
today with this inheritance, we are thoroughly impoverished and deprived of the
glory we once had in days gone by…and therefore we must, as Arabs, or Muslims,
open our eyes properly and look at the clear reality, which is the following.
History,
always, only belongs to the time period in which it was born. It does not
bequeath glory or decline but only bequeaths one thing, which is the lesson.
Europe,
however, to the extent that it has developed in the field of natural sciences
and its methods, has gone backwards in the field of other indisputable, fixed
notions, such as what falls under the category of abstract and unseen matters.
It was incumbent
upon their scholars and thinkers, in view of these fixed notions, to travel one
of two paths.
Either they
firmly close the door of research and reflection between themselves and these
matters and regard what they have acquired from the other, material sciences as
freeing them of the need to spend any intellectual effort in anything besides
them, or they approach them with a method of objectivity and pure scientific
examination, for they were not able to turn away from them.
The
reality, however, is that they did not do the former or the latter. Rather,
they were happy to adopt a method of studying them and researching them that
could, in the very least, be described as strange and curious.
They
started their research with the premise of whatever theories and postulates in
their minds pleased them: everything was according to what they found appealing
and according to the inspiration of the environment, the society and the study
in whose shadow they grew up. Then they were pleased to extract suitable,
inferred evidences for what they had already presumed and relied upon just as
they were pleased, conversely, to declare false the evidences that defied what
they relied upon, with no motive other than the desire to do so.
In order
not to wrong the minority of researchers who have turned away from their
desires and allowed their thoughts to receive a portion of free, pure research,
we should say that this description applies to the mentality that is found in
the majority of Western thinkers, and in the majority of scientific issues that
have the same, aforementioned imprint.
There is no
doubt that one of the clearest repercussions of this reality and the most
obvious of its significant indicators is those schools of thought that have
emerged claiming that theology can follow psychical desire and be subject to
it.
Thus, it
suffices you, in order for you to believe in something with firm conviction,
that your desire direct itself towards that thing and that you feel the need
for it. At the same time, your
desire, or your need, will not be unable to extract one evidence after another
for you according to what you prefer to believe in.
At the
forefront of those who have adopted this method and means of research is the
famous American thinker William James. His well-known book Pragmatism is
one of the most important sources that explain and advocate this method.
The
strangest manifestation of this method, which has attracted a large group of
Western researchers, materialises when James divides the necessary intellectual
tendencies into two: living and dead, and he explains the dead tendency as
being what the researcher has no inclination towards. He then gives an example
of this tendency. If it is said to someone, ‘Be a Sufi’, or ‘Be a Muslim’, as
opposed to being told, ‘Be a Christian’ or ‘Be an agnostic’; the first half of
the research has already been judged as false because the tendency towards it
is absent and one's desire is to turn away from it.[23]
There is no
doubt that this method, which has been advocated by others besides William
James, has also been opposed (from the theoretical standpoint) by several
others. However, the factual evidences of the various researches articulate,
even with regards to these opponents, the very same method and they call out
with a raised voice that theology, whether positive or negative, must be based
on a large portion of mere desire, if we do not say desire alone. This means
that it is folly for you to look for any semblance of objectivity in their
researches, except for a rare minority from amongst them, and especially
because the path of inference–which is the sole path for their verifications in
this domain–is extremely malleable because it responds to every desire and
tendency.
What James
and other Western thinkers have in common is that they create the fabric of
religious belief in their thoughts from the fibres of the various worldly
interests that people incline towards in their lives and livelihoods. There is
no doubt that it is not their religious doctrines that emanate from their
thoughts and intellects and into their lives but the other way around: they
emanate from the actuality of their lives and daily affairs and into their
thoughts and intellects.
Look at how
the British thinker Bentham illustrates this method in the clearest of ways. He
says:
‘Religion
must conform with what utility requires. The influence that religion has is
based on punishment and reward, and thus its punishment must be directed at
those actions that only harm the social condition, while its reward should be
restricted to actions that benefit. The only way for governance to be in
accordance with religion is to look at it from the angle of political good for
the nation only. Anything besides that should not be looked at.’
When they
found that the nature of the intellect differs completely from this method in
research and examination, and they saw that abandoning the intellect’s bridle,
letting it think about unseen and abstract matters as it wants, would lead to
many of their intellectual principles and rules', which they had established
upon this method, falling into ruin, they could not be bothered to establish
another intellectual school based on scorning the intellect and denying its
proofs and evidences, and to warn one another about the dangers of the
intellect to religion (i.e. to the religion that they understand according to
their method that we have clarified) using the slogan: ‘Saving Religion from
the Intellect.’ (!)
You know
that the course of this strange path, just as it requires them not to look at
the pure intellect, for the sake of conscripting general intellectual values
behind the various interests and benefits that they had agreed upon, also
requires the denial of every other understanding of these values and doctrines
that does not agree with their interests, regardless of their connection to the
intellect and regardless of how self-evident and obvious they are.
Because of
this you find them–at a time in which they are shackling their intellects for
fear of the dangers they would pose to the doctrines they have established in
compliance with certain circumstances in their lives–swooping down and
attacking our doctrines, which have been established, as you have seen, in
compliance with the rule of the pure intellect in accordance with its sound
scientific method: and that is by their claim, in which they know they are
lying, of free thinking and intellect and not being guided except by science!
In other words, this attack is cloaked in rational, free research yet it is
nothing but in compliance with the same method that they have adhered to, which
is that any doctrine that does not agree with their various interests,
inclinations and hopes deserves to be fought against, regardless of its proofs
and sources.
By my
reckoning, all I am obliged to do is place before the reader several examples,
most of which share in affirming two specific matters: the path of pure
inference that is free of any checking or investigation, and the effect of the
desire to defend against a specific trend and build one’s theology on its
foundations.
1- Von Kramer
and Goldziher relate that people researched a strange matter, which was: do
non-Arab men marry Arab women in Paradise? This was because of their desire to
establish that the Islamic Conquests bore the hidden objective of Arab
dominance.
There is no
doubt that whoever reads this text will imagine that a great mass of people
researched this topic and that those who researched it were jurists (fuqahāʾ),
because it is something that concerns jurists before anyone else.
However, if
you go back to the source of the story and its chain of transmission and
reality you will know that the “people” who looked into the topic of non-Arabs
marrying Arab women in Paradise were actually one Bedouin who had come from the
desert. Al-Aṣmaʿī heard him saying to someone else, ‘Do you think these
non-Arabs will marry our women in Paradise?’ He replied, ‘I think so, and
righteous action is by Allah’. It is a story that has been related by
al-Mubarrad in al-Kāmil and he declares its certainty weak.[26]
So
contemplate how a report that had been cut off from its source was put forward
and presented in a general way, and forced to speak, against its will, and testify
to what the "pure, scientific, objective" researcher wanted!
2- In the
book The Philosophy of Religious Thought between Islam and Christianity by
Louis Ghardiah and G. Qanwātī,[27] it is
mentioned that ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān approached the Qurʾān during his caliphate
and divided it into chapters (sūr) and verses (āyāt) and he
arranged the chapters according to length, starting with the longest and then
the next longest and so forth. (v.1 p.42)
So
contemplate, first of all, the method followed in order to establish this claim
or hypothesis and you will know that the method is absent from its foundations.
The authors have merely put this claim in front of us so that we close our eyes
and accept it as it is, forgetting the statement of the poet:
Claims, if
you do not establish them upon
Clear proofs, they will give rise to pleas
From what
investigative, demonstrative or inferential source was it established that
ʿUthmān was the one who divided the Qurʾān into chapters and verses, that he
deliberately arranged them according to his own desire and that he arranged
them starting with the longest of them, and that he did so knowing that it was
his prerogative to decide that this one should be long and this one should be
short?
As for us,
what we know according to the authentic, established narration of the Messenger
of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, and from ʿUthmān himself, is
that the entire matter of the verses and their arrangement and then the
chapters and their division and arrangement goes back to at-tawqīf, which
no one, not even the Messenger of Allah, may Allah bless him and grant him
peace, has a hand in. Our proof for this is what al-Bukhārī has related with
his own chain of transmission on the authority of Ibn Zubayr, who said, ‘I said
to ʿUthmān, “This verse, “Those who die leaving wives behind” until
His statement: “without their having to leave their homes”. [al-Baqarah
2:240] has been abrogated by the other verse, so why do you write it?” He
replied, “O my cousin, I do not change anything from its
place”.’ And there is what al-Qurṭubī and others have related with
an authentic chain of transmission on the authority of Sulaymān ibn Bilāl, who
said, ‘I heard Rabīʿah being asked, “Why do al-Baqarah and Āl ʿImrān come first
when some eighty chapters were revealed before them and both of them were
revealed in Madīnah?” Rabīʿah replied, “They come first, and the Qurʾān has
only been compiled according to the One Who compiled it”.’
3- Now you
have this example:
The
orientalist Gibb, in his work “The Structure of Religious Thought in Islam”, says
that Islam came to give a religious character to ancient Arab “animism”, which
had been weaved by the customs and the environment, after Muḥammad, peace and
blessings be upon him, had been unable to get rid of it. And he continued to
affirm that–with odd and strange seriousness–using a method that was based on
his deep penetration into inference, or indeed pure guesswork in most cases.
But all of
the above is of the utmost simplicity compared to what follows:
Gibb says
in the introduction to this book of his, ‘The ideas that these chapters are
based on are not the product of my own mind. Rather, I was led to them and
shown them by a group of thinkers and leading Muslims whose names would
constitute a lengthy list. It, therefore, suffices me to mention one of them,
and he is the great sheikh, Shah Wali Allah ad-Dahlawi’. Then he
quotes his book Ḥujjat Allāhi al-Bālighah. This is the established,
literal text, in quotation marks, which I am transmitting to the noble reader:
‘Indeed the
Prophet, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent with a mission that
contained a second mission. The first was to the children of Ismāʿīl…this
mission necessitated that the contents of his Revealed Law be rites and
practices of worship and types of usefulness that they were familiar with, as
the Revealed Law was only to rectify what they already had, not burden them
with something they had absolutely no knowledge of’.
We say there
is no doubt that Gibb did not come across this expression in the book in
isolation without looking at anything that came before it or after it. That
would be impossible, as the expression is embedded in a long discussion that
surrounds it from all sides. Here we find–unfortunately–the most serious kind
of treachery in research and quotation, which is that he deliberately distorted
what was being said and made the speaker responsible for what he was not
responsible for, and tried to make him say what he was innocent of.
What is
amazing is that if we were to go back and look in the books of those who came
before us for a comprehensive refutation of Gibb’s fantasies that he has put
forward in this book of his, we would not find a refutation more profound and
more comprehensive than what is found in the book of Shah Walī Allah
ad-Dahlawī, in his book Ḥujjat Allāhi al-Bālighah, on the same page
from which Gibb plucked out this text in order to support what he was saying.
It is as if Allah, Mighty and Majestic, inspired him to
cut the means of whoever would come after him and load his speech with that
which he never intended and make him say what he never could have said. Here is
what he said:
‘Know that
he, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, was sent with the Ismāʿīlī
Ḥanafiyyah in
order to straighten its crookedness, remove its distortions and spread its
light. This is the Exalted’s statement: “the religion of your
forefather Ibrāhīm.” [al-Ḥajj 22:78] As that was the case, it was
necessary for the foundations of that religion to be intact and its practices
established. This meant that the Prophet was sent to a people who still had the
remnants of rightly guided Sunnah, and
thus there was no point in changing it or altering it. Rather, the obligation
was to affirm it because it was more malleable to their souls and a firmer
proof against them. The children of Ismāʿīl inherited the way of their father
Ismāʿīl and they were upon that Revealed Law until ʿAmr ibn Luḥayy came into
existence and inserted things into it according to his corrupt opinion, and
thus he went astray and led others astray. He introduced the worship of idols
and new, unbound practices. There was the nullification of the Religion and the
mixing of the correct with the corrupt, and they were overwhelmed by ignorance,
idolatry and disbelief. Allah then sent our master, Muḥammad, may Allah bless
him and grant him peace, to straighten their crookedness and rectify their
corruption. He, may Allah bless him and grant him peace, looked at their law
and whatever corresponded with the way of Ismāʿīl, peace be upon him, and the
rites of Allah, he commanded that it remain, and whatever was a distortion or
corruption or from the rites of idol worship and disbelief, he nullified it and
recorded its nullification.’
What cannot
be doubted is that Gibb knew about this text, which follows those sentences
that we quoted from him, and it is, as you can see, nothing but an elaboration
and explanation of their contents, as
anyone who reflects knows. Thus, how can it be possible to ignore it and pay no
attention to it, or indeed not be content with that alone and go to the extent
of claiming that in affirming his ideas he was relying on al-Dahlawī, on this
man who utterly pulverised these fantasies, as you can see?
Thus, this
is the reality of the scientific method that is followed by most Westerners
when they enter into a scientific discussion with others, or when they want to
establish some hypothesis or fact, or when they try to extract some knowledge
or grasp some certainty from a text or document in history: The path of
inference comes first. Second,
they subject the research to nothing but will and desire. Third, they then
deliberately distort transmissions and texts.
When we
know these realities, and some of their many examples, we have no choice but to
thank a researcher like ʿAbdur Raḥmān Badawī when he warns us–in an absolutely
sublime fashion, and after his discussion on the retrieval method of Westerners–against
explaining any historical text in other than the language of the age in which
it was written, against ignoring the context and what precedes it, and against
speculating in understanding an indication or expression according to other
than what the context of the entire expression leads to.
However, what
is amazing about his statement is that these pieces of advice are directed at
Muslim scholars, those to whom the graciousness of drawing attention to this
precision and trust goes back to, and to whom goes back the graciousness of
applying it in the most comprehensive of ways, without directing any of this
advice at these Westerners whom he is excessively impressed by and speaks at
great length about their methods, unfortunate examples of which we have just
shown. Instead of doing that, he directed it at Muslim scholars, imagining one
of them to be stealing a Qurʾānic verse or Prophetic ḥadīth–as they say–in
order to support contemporary statements that have no connection to them
whatsoever apart from the literal wording.
I was
hoping from ʿAbdur Raḥmān Badawī–and he ignored what these people did with
their method of research–that he would mention to us one example of a
researcher from amongst the Muslim scholars (from amongst those who do not
imitate their rulers in following their retrieval and intuitive method) who
quoted a text and distorted it, or started deriving significant scientific
facts with ropes of inference strengthened by nothing more than guesswork and
speculation.
Thus, it is
for you, after fully understanding everything we have mentioned, to be
completely amazed at those who call religious facts that Muslim researchers
have arrived at by way of their scientific method, which we have elucidated, “dogma” and those
who hold them “dogmatists”. Then they look at what the philosophers of the West
imagine, and those who have deviated from religion, and call it “science” and
call the proponents of this imagining “scientists”! In other words, religion as
Gibb understands it with his non-existent method, which we have seen, is
science, and his way of thinking is scientific. As for religion as understood
by Muslim scholars in accordance with the scientific method that we have
illustrated, it is pure dogma, and their way of thinking is just a dogmatic
exercise!
Thus,
intelligent reader, be an honest, objective researcher, and call this group of
people (whether they are Arabs or non-Arabs, Muslims or non-Muslims) whatever
pure, scientific investigation shows them to be.
The chief
factor behind the failure of Westerners’ research methods
And despite
that, let me speak to you about the deep reason for this strange phenomenon in
these people:
Westerners,
in terms of their stance towards the Christian religion, fall into two
categories: those who profess it, submit to it and believe in all of its
contents and rulings, and those who disavow it, do not submit to it and are not
lead to following it and professing it.
As for
those amongst them who profess it, they are unable to digest the doctrines of
their religion and all of its elements by way of science and the intellect (because
the intellect and science clearly defy many of its requirements, reconciliation
and interpretation are not possible) but they have also found that their
natural, human disposition, urges them to find a religion to adhere to and an
object of worship to be subject to, and they have become certain that many
moral values have no guarantee of being realised without the guarantee of
religion and its control over the soul. Thus, they have come to find themselves
between two matters, there is no third in front of them that is true to their
environment: either they reject this false religion or they reject sound
intellect, but they have preferred the second over the first and rejected sound
intellect without rejecting the false religion. Thus, they truly are
dogmatists.
As for
those amongst them who do not profess it, they have preferred rejecting the
false religion over rejecting sound intellect, but they have sufficed with the
requirements of sound intellect by denying the religion that they have and
interpreting it according to what they imagine and what they think, without
looking at the True Teligion whose principles and rulings in totality both the
intellect and science submit to. They have been barred from that by other
feelings, and they are the feelings of European, subjective partisanship and
the constant fear that the Muslims will return once again to dominating the
world, as they were in the past. Thus, these people have been called secularists.
Then you
know that amongst Arabs and Muslims there are individuals whom you consider to
be people who articulate, comprehend and speak, but in reality they are nothing
but pale shadows that stretch and move with the movements of Europe, the
thoughts of Europe and the philosophy of Europe.
These
people are of the opinion that religion in Europe has two explanations, a
positive explanation, which in reality is purely a dogmatic explanation, and a
negative explanation, which, as they call it over there, is a purely scientific
explanation. They brought these two explanations from over there and imposed
them on the religion of Islam here, for nothing other than to complete the
shadow and have blind imitation reinforced from all sides.
This, then,
is the deep reason for this strange phenomenon in these people.
This
category of people does not concern us at all after the intelligent,
reflective, free person knows, from everything we have clarified in this
introduction, that Islam does not mean those religious beliefs that Europe
holds in defiance of the intellect, and that Islam, in all its principles and
doctrines, stands upon an exact, honest, scientific method that is only drawn
by the hand of the intellect alone, without letting partisanship, the desire to
believe something, or blind imitation and following have any sway.
***
Other
excerpts from the translation:
Allah Exists
Man's Creation and the Theory of
Evolution
Decree and Predestination
What we mean by ‘Religion’ here
is specifically Islam, and it is known that there are massive differences
between Islam and other religions in this regard.
(tn): i.e. it impossible that
all of these people could have conspired to lie.
(tn): e.g. floods, storms etc.
(tn): e.g. rain being the means of crops
growing, etc.
(tn): i.e. implication of
connection, which is similar to circumstantial evidence in legal contexts.
(tn): or it is an indication.
(tn): i.e. an unclear
connection.
(tn): i.e. existing only
temporarily as opposed to eternally.
(tn): i.e. a clear connection in
a specific sense.
(tn): i.e. jurisprudence.
(tn): i.e. the scholars of
theology and especially kalām, or scholastic theology.
What we mean by influence is
that that causation between the cause and the thing caused is established by
proof, such as rain's causing vegetation and fire's causing burning,
irrespective of researching the reality of this causation and analysing it in the
light of faith in the Real Causer (al-Musabbib al-Ḥaqīqī), Mighty and
Majestic, and the place for research is in analysing that and discussing the
law of causation in the universe, which I shall return to in its proper place
in this book.
(tn): in other words, the
existence of water in a given location only allows for the possibility of
people’s living there, it does not necessitate such.
See p.200 and onwards of Manāhij
al-Baʿth al-ʿIlmī by ʿAbdur Raḥmān Badawī.
(tn): i.e. it has been
transmitted from so many sources that it would be impossible for all of them to
have conspired to lie.
(tn): i.e. in meaning, as
opposed to exact wording (lafẓī).
(tn): i.e. attaching the second
event, which has no textual ruling, to the first event, which does have a
textual ruling, because the two events are the same in terms of the cause (ʿillah)
of the ruling.
In this book, this will be
discussed in the section on Prophecy, starting on p.144.
The experiential [(tn): or
experimental] method can only be relied on in the natural sciences, since it is
from the very nature of these sciences that they cannot be grasped with
certainty unless it is by way of beginning with subject matters that are found
in external experience and are far removed from inspiration of the mind or
cogitation. Then they impose themselves upon it according to what
observation and experience indicate, and after that, the duty of the mind is
merely to expound it and analyse it.
Furthermore, some imbeciles, who
have not realised that there are differences in the natures of the various
sciences, persist–relying on the experiential method–in not having faith in the
Creator, Mighty and Majestic, as long as that cannot be established by the
experiential method. These miserable people are under the delusion that when
Europe got trains moving due to its natural sciences and got electricity
working and launched rockets using experiential studies, this proved that all
universal realities should be transformed into natural sciences and thus be
subjected to experience and observation, and if not then the ruling of a judge
in the court cannot be accepted, nor can a law in psychology. These
people have no readiness to imagine any reality that is from the events of the
past or the apprehensions of the future, because all of that is nothing more
than the fruits of,
induction, or inference,
or analogy. As long as all of that is far removed from experience and
observation, it is nonsense. It has no existence. There is no doubt that this kind
of thinking is in greater need of discussion and negotiation.
Uṣūl ash-Sharāʾiʿ, 37. (tn): It is fruitless to
translate an English statement translated into Arabic back into English. This
statement, however, appears not to be a direct quote from Jeremy Bentham but a
summary of his ideas. Uṣūl ash-Sharāʾiʿ, by Aḥmad Fatḥī Zaghlūl, which
was first published in 1892, is an Arabic translation of the French work Traites
De Legislation Civile et Penale by Etienne Dumont, which was first published
in 1802. While this work is regarded as the French translation of Bentham’s
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, it is not a
verbatim translation of the English work. Dumont states the following in his
foreword, ‘I begin with a declaration that should protect me from any unfair
reproach, as well as any painful praise for me, because it would not be
merited. I declare that I have no share, no title of association in the
composition of these various works: they belong entirely to the author, and
belong only to him’. (Traites De Legislation Civile et Penale (Paris:
Rey Et Gravier, 1830), 1:i-ii) He then says, ‘My work, of a subordinate nature,
has only touched on details. It was necessary to make a choice among a large
number of variants, to remove repetitions, to clarify obscure parts, to bring
together everything that belonged to the same subject, and to fill in the gaps
that the author had left in order not to slow down his composition’. (Ibid.) Regarding
An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Dumont
says, ‘His Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,
considered by a small number of enlightened appreciators as one of those
original productions that mark an era and revolution in a science, despite its
philosophical merit, or perhaps because of this very merit, made no sensation
and remained almost unknown to the public, although in England, more than
elsewhere, a useful book is forgiven for not being an easy and pleasant book.
In using several chapters of this work to form the General Principles of
Legislation, I had to avoid what had harmed its success, the overly scientific
forms, the overly multiplied subdivisions and overly abstract analyses. I did
not translate the words, I translated the ideas: I made in some respects an
abridgement, and in others a commentary. I guided myself on the advice and
indications of the author in a preface subsequent to the work itself by several
years; and I found in his papers all the additions of any importance’. (Ibid.
1: iv-v) Therefore, I have had little choice but to translate the Arabic
statement back into English. I have not been able to find any similar quote in An
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. It may be in one
of the other documents that Bentham gave to Dumont, which Dumont explains in
his foreword, and even so, the quote may have been edited or summarised by
Dumont. Thus, while the statement might not be a direct quote from Bentham, it
is safe to say that it is consistent with his ideas. And Allah knows best.
Refer to al-Kāmil by
al-Mubarrad, v.2 in the section on clients of the Arabs.
(tn): i.e. they are as Allah has
commanded, there is no room for ijtihād, or personal reasoning.
In this book, The
Philosophy of Religious Thought, there is a great deal of scum, which both
authors used liberally in the inferential path first and in the desire to
arrive at a specific conclusion second. Maybe we will get the opportunity, from
this scum, to show the thing that increases in exposing the value of
“pragmatism” and “objectivity” according to these researchers.
(tn): i.e. rejecting
idol-worship and adhering to the True Religion.
(tn): i.e. customary practice,
and in this context it means a source of legislation.
See Ḥujjat Allāhi
al-Bālighah by ad-Dahlawī (1/97, 98 and 99) and the work “The
Structure of Religious Thought in Islam” by the English Orientalist Gibb. (tn):
Arabic readers can see the aforementioned Arabic translation.
(tn): i.e. draw a conclusion
first.
